Highways, roadblocks and empires by Hayden Robert M.
Robert M. Hayden 
University of Pittsburgh 
 
Original scientific paper 
UDK: 316.752:338.47(497)  
Received 21 April 2008 
DOI:10.2298/SOC0804337H  
HIGHWAYS, ROADBLOCKS AND EMPIRES
* 
Autoputevi, blokade i carstva 
APSTRAKT »Izgradnja Balkana« zahteva izgradnju infrastrukture, posebno autoputeva. U 
ovom  radu  izgradnja  autoputeva i  ometanje  te  izgradnje na  Balkanu posmatraju  se  kao 
konkretna  oličenja  metafora  uključivanja  i  razdvajanja.  Dok  je  infrastruktura  uglavnom 
»opipljiva«,  prepreke  na  putu,  koje  obično  nastaju  usled  ideoloških  stavova,  često  su 
»neopipljive«, ali veoma stvarne; njih Evropska unija i Sjedinjene američke države stvaraju 
isto koliko i sami narodi Balkana. Osnovni argument je da infrastrukture povezuju ljude 
bolje nego ideologije i da davanje prednosti »vrednostima« u odnosu na praktičnije oblike 
povezanosti (što rade i EU i SAD) ometa uspostavljanje normalnih veza među narodima 
Balkana. Najzad, u radu je pomenuta i anticipatorna nostalgija za balkanskom raznolikošću, 
koja  bi  mogla  biti  ugrožena  uključivanjem  ovog  regiona  u  ujedinjavajuće  strukture  i 
ideologije Evropske unije. 
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ABSTRACT “Building the Balkans” requires the construction of infrastructures, especially 
highways. In this paper, I look at the construction and obstruction of highway systems in the 
Balkans as concrete manifestations of metaphors of incorporation and separation. While the 
infrastructure is mainly tangible, the roadblocks, largely due to ideological positions, are 
often intangible but very real, and are created as much by the European Union and the US 
as  by  the  peoples  of  the  Balkans  themselves.  The  basic  argument is  that  infrastructures 
connect people better than ideologies do, and that putting “values” before more practical 
linkages (which both the EU and the US are doing) hinders the establishment of normal links 
between  the  Balkans  peoples.  Finally,  I  add  a  few  words  of  anticipatory  nostalgia  for 
Balkans diversity that may well be threatened by the region’s incorporation into the unifying 
structures, and ideologies, of the European Union.  
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  After so many years of observing, analyzing and talking about conflicts in 
the Balkans, there are signs of a more widely held optimism about the Balkans. The 
commonly  used  term  “the  Western  Balkans”  is  an  interesting  bit  of  symbolic 
geography,  considering  the  previously  robust  trope  of  the  Balkans  as  being 
antithetical to anything Western. It is also interesting that one EU policy website 
refers to the region as a “white hole” on some kinds of maps; “black hole” has been 
a more frequently used term. That website dealt with plans to develop highways in 
the region, so the “white hole,” denoting something missing from the map, not only 
had descriptive salience but also prescriptive relevance: the white hole will be filled 
as the region’s transportation infrastructure develops. 
Some  of  the  positive  views  of  the  region  stress  the  growth  of  market 
economies.
1 Markets alone, however, are inadequate to build long-lasting social and 
political relationships. We are all aware of the brisk trade that went on during the 
wars in ex-Yugoslavia (see Glenny 2008): all kinds of goods passing illegally but 
very  profitably  during  the  international  sanctions  on  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Yugoslavia, from Albania to Serbia, for example, or Montenegro to Italy; and the 
Yugoslav border crossings were dangerous mainly because of the huge quantities of 
gasoline  being  traded  over  them  in  makeshift  containers,  which,  given  Balkans 
smoking practices, could  explode at any  minute. Croatian forces in Bosnia hired 
Serb equipment to use against Muslims; the United States hired Turkish aircraft to 
bring weapons paid for by the Iranians into Croatia and thence to Bosnia, all illegal 
activity internationally and by US law (Wiebes 2003). After the war, some of the 
most effective economic ties were illegal ones, so that, for example, at one point in 
the late 1990s the major cigarette factories in Albania, Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia 
were  all  being  supplied  with  filters  from  a  brand-new  plant  in  the  “Republika 
Srpska” when that “entity” was still under international sanctions that banned such 
trade.  Since  the  plant  wasn’t  registered  anywhere,  though,  the  sanctions  were 
meaningless, there being, officially, no trade to stop. Business, it seems, goes on, but 
does not necessarily build stable relationships. 
On the  other  hand, it is clear that stable social and political structures  do 
facilitate trade that is more efficient, and if the profit margins are lower than they are 
in the black  market, so  is the risk. Increasing trade, in turn, can lead increasing 
prosperity and increased social and political connections. Such was the idea behind 
the formation of the European Economic Community, now the European Union. 
Yet the “white hole” in the infrastructure of the western Balkans is a reality. 
There are  impediments to trade, and to forging stable political relationships, but 
there are also now real efforts to fill the gap. In this paper, I want to explore some of 
the ways that infrastructures for increased trade and increasing cultural, social and 
political ties are being (re)built in the Balkans region, but I also want to discuss 
———— 
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some of the roadblocks that are slowing down these processes. Further, I will draw 
some parallels to other places and times. One of the attitudes I find most frustrating 
in the Balkans is the self-deprecating assertion that things are uniquely bad there – 
“samo  kod  nas,”  I  am  told,  “only  here”  or  “only  we”  could  do  something  so 
politically stupid and/ or corrupt; and then hear a story of some kind of corruption or 
political stupidity that sounds  much  like Chicago, to say nothing  of Washington 
D.C.. Recalling that some of the less admirable aspects of the Balkans are hardly 
unique to the region, or to the present, can help us impart some realism into our 
discussions. 
Roads and Freeways 
  Let me start by invoking the Balkans region before it was “the Balkans” but 
rather  the  Roman  province  of  Moesia.  In  July  2007,  I  made  a  brief  visit  to  the 
Roman ruins of Medijana, near Niš. The site is now on the outskirts of the city, but 
when it was built (3rd century AD) it was about 3 Roman miles (4.5 km) from the 
Roman town of Naissus, which itself was on the main road to Serdulica, now Sofia. 
Naissus was the birthplace of the emperor Constantine, who returned there a number 
of times, and was also visited by other emperors since it was on the main road to the 
east (Drča 2006). In fact, five major Roman roads converged in Naissus, making the 
city of critical importance (Syme 1999: 130). The Medijana site consisted of villas, 
some quite large and ornate, with huge, wonderful, mosaics and waterworks. They 
were not fortified when built, indicating that they were not expected to be subject to 
attack; Naissus was, after all, well within the empire, though the villas were later 
sacked, seriatim, by the Huns, Goths and Slavs as the empire collapsed. 
I  mention this Roman crossroads at this conference  on  very contemporary 
issues  to  point  out  the  importance  of  roads  within  empires.  Serious  empires, 
including those of Rome, China, the Ottomans, the Incas and the Aztecs, constructed 
networks  of  roads,  for  communication,  trade,  and  military  purposes.  If  we  are 
talking  about  building  the  Balkans  anew,  we  must  consider  the  nature  of  the 
infrastructures for doing so, along with the conditions that let such infrastructures be 
built and operate. 
Infrastructures must be continually used, and upgraded, or they fade away. 
The roads to and from Niš illustrate this phenomenon. Serdulica is still there, as 
Sofia, about 165 km away, but the road from Niš to Sofia is not a good one. While 
there is a very fine superhighway between Belgrade and Niš (the damage caused by 
NATO in 1999 having been quickly repaired), it turns towards Skopje after Niš, and 
not even that road is finished. It is projected to go through places like Preševo and 
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that would connect Serbia and Macedonia through territory within Serbia but almost 
entirely inhabited, now, by Albanians and adjacent to Kosovo. 
But  there  is  no  freeway  even  planned  from  Niš  to  Sofia,  and  not  on  the 
Bulgarian side  either: the freeways out  of Sofia run to the  east, towards Edirne, 
Turkey, though they don’t get even close to that border. In fact, the freeways in 
Bulgaria do not reach any of the country’s borders. But then neither do those in 
Romania or Serbia or Croatia – except that in the case of the last two countries, there 
is a good freeway linking them to each other, and therein lies a tale, but I discuss 
that below. 
Albania and Montenegro have  no freeways at all. Bosnia has a very short 
stretch  of  freeway squarely  in the  middle of the country, along the river Bosna, 
connecting  the  middle  of  nowhere  with  someplace  about  twenty  km  from  there. 
Macedonia does have a freeway to the border with Serbia but, as already mentioned, 
the  connecting  sector  from  Niš  is  not  even  in  the  construction  stage,  much  less 
completed. The Macedonian freeway doesn’t make it to Greece, even though the 
Greek freeway (E-75) does reach the border. The same E-75 freeway in Serbia does 
get almost to the Hungarian border but the Hungarians have not built their part, so 
one  struggles  north  from  Szeged.  Turkey  has  built  a  good  road  from  Istanbul 
through Edirne to the Bulgarian border but, as mentioned, the Bulgarians haven’t 
built their part; there is no Greek freeway towards Turkey, though the E-75 through 
Thessaloniki does get to Macedonia, at Gevgelija. In the west, the E-70 connecting 
Belgrade and Zagreb was finished a few years ago. This is striking because in the 
former  Yugoslavia,  this  was  the  “Highway  of  Brotherhood  and  Unity”  (autoput 
bratstva – jedinstva), and, like “brotherhood and unity,” the project was never quite 
completed while the single country existed. 
Looking at the freeway systems of the Balkans, as shown on Google Earth, is 
revealing. It would appear that these highways were built mainly for internal use, not 
for facilitating international transport and trade. In those countries where freeways 
exist, you can use them to go between different cities in the same state; but not 
easily to get from one state to another. Back to Niš one more time: the 250 km to 
Belgrade can be easily covered in two hours, but traveling the 165 km to Sofia takes 
a lot longer. It is hard not to see the lack of freeways from the west to connect with 
Turkey’s roads to its own borders as symbolic of the lack of desire of the rest of 
Europe  to  be  linked  to  Turkey,  despite  that  country’s  efforts  to  facilitate  the 
connections. Basically, it seems that most Balkan states have had little interest in 
connecting with each other. 
There are, of course, technologies other than motor vehicles for getting people 
from one state to another, notably railroads and airplanes. The railroads in the region 
run but are clearly not of great priority – much as I love the overnight train between 
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sleeping cars are comfortable enough by my somewhat romantic and old-fashioned 
standards, the equipment is old. There are no plans to extend high-speed rail service 
to the Balkans. As for airplanes, it is usually easier to get from any Balkans capital 
to London, Frankfurt, Vienna or Paris than to any other Balkans capital – except, 
often enough, via Frankfurt, Vienna or Munich. 
Yet roads identified with long-distance travel, linking the major towns of the 
region, have existed in the region since at least the Roman empire – vide Naissus, 
after all. In fact, most of the projected freeway “corridors” track the old Roman main 
roads. And was there a city in the Ottoman Balkans that did not have a Stamboul 
Gate,  marking  the  road  to  the  imperial  capital  (in  Serbia,  still  sometimes  called 
Carigrad)? 
The  question  is  under  what  conditions  can  long-distance  roads,  and  other 
forms  of  interlinking  infrastructures,  be  envisioned,  constructed,  used  and 
maintained? This  is at the heart of the  matter, because  if  we are to speak about 
building  the  Balkans  anew,  we  need  to  consider  the  circumstances  under  which 
connections between the region’s various localities and peoples have been fostered 
on the one hand, broken on the other. 
Empires and Infrastructures 
It is this question that brings the concept of empires to the fore, because an 
empire is, among other things, a set of mechanisms to bring separate nations, and 
usually separate polities, into one cooperative framework for generating, collecting 
and centralizing wealth. Conflicts between groups of the natives would get in the 
way of these goals, so the key to running an empire has been to ensure that the 
subalterns obeyed, the exercise of power in the Foucaultian sense. However much 
empires may have been internally complex, the goal of imperial rule was not so 
much divide and conquer as balance and thereby exploit. 
Yet the period from 1804 (the first Serbian uprising) through 1918 was one of 
the  mutual  contestation,  then  decline  and  finally  disappearance  of  the  various 
empires that interfaced in the region, and the modern states are supposed to rest on 
the  self-determination  of  their  peoples  (leaving  aside  the  unfortunate  by 
contemporary standards reality that the conflict between peoples, as separate nations 
within states, has usually, in modern Europe, led to the brutal homogenization of 
territories  through  the  processes  now  known,  depending  mainly  on  whether  one 
approves of, regretfully accepts, or condemns them in any given case, as population 
transfers,  ethnic  cleansing,  and  genocide  [Hayden  1996]).  Certainly  there  are  no 
longer  any  emperors,  or  multi-polity  entities  that  can  claim,  as  sovereigns,  the 
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Union as a crime, though it remains one in the context of the citizens of each still-
sovereign member state. 
Still, the European Union does manifest a number of the traditional elements 
of sovereignty in the realm of the regulation of economic activities, and the issuing 
of  money.  This  last  is  especially  fascinating  in  regard  to  political  symbolism, 
because the planners of the Euro currency seem to have combined a good working 
knowledge of semiotics with the whole-sale acceptance of the concept of “imagined 
communities”  (Umberto  Eco  meets  Benedict  Anderson?).  That  is,  the  Euro 
banknotes embody an imagined Europe by incorporating stylized representations of 
windows,  signifying  openness,  and  bridges,  signifying  connections,  as  the  key 
European values; but the signifiers are arbitrary, as no real bridges, or windows, may 
be depicted. In fact, an early design of one of the banknotes was withdrawn when it 
became clear that it resembled to closely an actual bridge. Thus the symbols of the 
community are really imagined, in contrast to those of the currencies replaced by the 
Euro or of those still left in non-Euro countries, since these depict real persons of 
places seen as symbolically important to each country. Actually, the signified on the 
Euro  bills,  too,  are  arbitrary,  since  windows  may  also  be  closed,  and  not  all 
connections  are  beneficial,  as  epidemiologists,  among  others,  know  too  well. 
Diseases follow roadways, railways and now, skyways. 
The monetary symbolism is different in our region, modern rather than post-, 
and employing somewhat less arbitrary signs. Looking only at the banknotes that I 
happen to have handy, the Bulgarian lev notes carry Ivan Milev (5), Petar Beron 
(10), and Stefan Stambolov (20); Croatian kuna notes depict Ban Jelačić (20), Ivan 
Mazurin (100) and Stjepan Radić (200); and Serbian dinars depict Petar Petrović 
Njegoš  (20)  and  Nikola  Tesla  (100).  These  last  two  indicate  some  of  the 
complications that can come of putting historical figures onto the money because 
Tesla  was  a  Serb  from  Croatia  who  never  lived  in  Serbia.  Newly  independent 
Croatia put him on a postage stamp in 1993 but forces of the same Croatian state 
burned his ancestral home at about the same time, as had the previous Independent 
State of Croatia, 1941-45; yet by the 150
th anniversary of his birth, the Tesla home 
was restored and the presidents of both Croatia and Serbia were present. Adding to 
the  competing  claims  on  the  scientist,  Serbia  issued  a  Tesla  stamp,  as  did  the 
Republika Srpska Krajina (Croatia) and the Republika Srpska (Bosnia) in the early 
1990s.  For  his  part,  Njegoš,  the  poet-bishop-prince  of  Montenegro,  was  self-
consciously one of the founding figures of Serbian literature. How that literary fact 
squares with the new Montenegrin constitutional declaration that the language there 
is “Montenegrin” rather than Serbian, I’ll leave to others (ali, “Bog se dragi na Srbe 
razljuti/ za njihova smrtna sagrešenja….”). But speaking of literature, Ivo Andrić, 
the only Bosnian to win the Nobel prize for literature, is not on a Bosnian banknote 
because  the  Bosniaks  object,  while  Meša  Selimović  is  on  the  5  km  note  –  but Robert M. Hayden: Highways, roadblocks and empires  343 
Selimović said he wrote Serbian literature and died in Belgrade, and his images of 
Bosnian multiculturalism are, if anything, more grim than those of Andrić. 
I’m  reminded  of  the  2005  international  bestseller,  The  Historian  (Kostova 
2005),  in  which  Dracula  is  still  active  in  late-20
th  Century  Europe.  He  keeps 
returning  because  the  historians  just  won’t  leave  him  alone.  That  is,  they  keep 
insisting on studying him, and every time they do so, they thereby bring him back 
from the (un)dead. [I can’t help noting that in that novel, the protagonist’s father, a 
historian who unwittingly immerses her in the Dracula drama, is later killed by a 
landmine in Sarajevo – it seems that those people just never can leave these things 
alone! Dracula himself, though, is finally killed by an anthropologist, I am happy to 
say]. 
I  raise  the  symbolism  of  the  money  because  a  common  currency  is  a 
mechanism for uniting multiple peoples and polities, and not a new one: the dinar 
found  in  parts  of  our  region,  and  elsewhere  throughout  the  formerly  Ottoman 
empire, is descended in name from the denarius of the Roman empire, taking us 
back to Medijana: common roads, common currency, as imperial infrastructures. Of 
course, by the 1990s, there was a movement away from the dinar by the Slovenes 
(tolar), Croats (kuna) and by the international overseers of Bosnia (konvertabilna 
marka), a symbolic rejection of the Balkan heritage, among other things, though the 
Macedonians did not feel that need and keep the denar, while the Slovenes have 
since gone full European by adopting the Euro. But currencies make perfect carriers 
of  political  symbolism  because  they  are  useful  for  other  purposes.  In  Republika 
Srpska  in  Bosnia,  the  konvertabilna  marka  was  introduced  when  the  place 
functioned  with  the  Deutschmark,  and  was  originally  resisted  as  an  attempted 
imposition  of  multiculturalism.  Thus  in  December  1999  I  heard  the  wonderful 
rhetorical question in Banja Luka, “why should we use those Muslim marks [i.e., 
KM] when we have our own marks already” meaning the Deutschmark. Yet since 
the KM was completely interchangeable for DM, rejecting the former would have 
been  massively  inconvenient,  and  within  a  very  short  time  there  was  no  longer 
resistance to it, though it is doubtful that anybody buys into its symbolism. But they 
don’t  have  to  buy  into  the  symbolism  if  the  monetary  infrastructure  works,  for 
utilitarian purposes. After all, few if any of even the most die-hard atheists in the 
USA try to black out “In God We Trust” on the money. 
Borders and Roadblocks 
Which returns us to the theme of this paper, building the Balkans. What is 
likely to be most effective is infrastructure that has high utilitarian value: freeways, 
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interaction. And while one would think that building such infrastructure is at the 
heart of the process of incorporating the region into the structures of the EU, thus 
far, at least, it hasn’t always been so. From the start of the Yugoslav conflicts, some 
of the most important actions by the EU and US have insisted on creating obstacles: 
borders, between the ex-Yugoslav republics and between most of them and their 
neighbors. This was striking in 1991: at the very time that the European community 
was  metamorphosing  into  the  EU  and  removing  most  borders  interior  to  that 
European  community,  the  EU  was  supporting  the  creation  of  old-fashioned, 
guarded, borders in the former Yugoslavia, in places that had not been so divided for 
generations. 
To make matters worse, the imposition of economic sanctions on Serbia from 
1992 throughout most of the rest of the decade had greater negative impacts on the 
rest of the region than on Serbia itself. Certainly those sanctions did not damage the 
Milošević regime,  which  instead  found  ways to profit from their command  over 
crucial resources in an economy of increasing scarcity (see Dinkić 1997). [I recall 
asking people in Washington in 1993 why, if economic isolation was so threatening 
to a regime, the formerly socialist countries had imposed sanctions upon themselves 
for decades, and why the US was doing the job for Slobo that Ceausescu had to do 
for himself. I never did get an answer, but it may be obvious why my expertise 
wasn’t  much  in  demand  in  policy  circles].  In  the  late  1990s,  the  World  Bank 
acknowledged that international economic sanctions on the Serb-controlled parts of 
Bosnia  had  themselves  contributed  to  the  lack  of  economic  integration  of  the 
country  even  though  such  integration  was  one  of  the  key  criteria  for  Bosnia’s 
economic development (Hurtic et al 2000: 347-350). 
The 1991 borders continue to add to the costs of doing business in the region, 
and thereby hinder the economic development of the Balkans. Even with the wars 
over,  sanctions  lifted,  and  trade  developing  between  and  across  the  formerly 
Yugoslav space, the borders are real barriers. While one could now in theory drive 
the 366 km from Belgrade to Zagreb, at legal speeds, in less than three hours (and 
who  drives  legal  speeds  on  a  European  highway?),  the  international  border  will 
delay  you  from  15  or  20  minutes  to  many  hours,  and  that’s  if  you’re  in  an 
automobile. Trucks routinely lose hours there, sometimes days, as they do at the 
other new borders within the former Yugoslavia. 
The  fairly  obvious  response  to  this  situation  would  be  to  accelerate  the 
incorporation of the whole Balkans into the structures of the EU. However, there is 
yet another set of roadblocks stemming from the perhaps smug ideology of the EU, 
as a union founded on values, and that the non-member Balkan states can only aspire 
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“Values” and Roadblocks 
The idea that Europe is a community based on common values is certainly at 
variance  with the  history  of the  development from the European Coal and Steel 
Community,  through  the  Common  Market,  then  the  European  Economic 
Community,  then  the  European  Community  and  now  the  European  Union.  The 
development of the EU was based on the premise that the development of common 
values  would  follow  the  development  of  common  interests,  especially  economic 
interests.  Conditioning  economic  integration  on  the  adoption  of  values-driven 
institutions  (e.g.  protection  of  minorities)  is  thus  contrary  to  the  historical 
development of the EU, as well as to the historical development of most EU member 
states, which was rather more likely to be based on fierce homogenization than on 
multiculturalism.  Current  treatment  of  minorities  in  the  Balkans  often  seems  to 
differ little from those in some of the EU member states that proclaim the greatest 
piety towards human rights. One might well be better off as a Rom in Bulgaria or 
Serbia  than  in  the  Czech  Republic,  or  as  a  Bosniak  in  Serbia  than  a  Turk  in 
Germany, and the position of Arabs in France has a lot in common with that of 
Albanians in Serbia or Serbs in Kosovo. 
What especially is not working well is the insistence that the countries of ex-
Yugoslavia  establish  some  kind  of  common  understanding  of  the  events  of  the 
1990s, or earlier. By the  nature of  wars of nationalist wars of secession and the 
consolidation of ethnic states, there are some fairly major events that simply will not 
be placed into a common understanding between the public politics and the elites of 
the contesting nations, for quite a long time if indeed ever. For example, on August 
5  of  2007  I  had  the  chance  to  watch  Croatian  television’s  broadcast  of  the 
celebrations in Knin marking the victory of Croatian forces in the “homeland war,” 
and on Serbian television a documentary on the expulsion of most of the Serbs from 
Croatia that accompanied that victory. Croatian TV had almost nothing on the latter 
topic or on the murders of Serbs who stayed, including many elderly people, but the 
Serbian show had very little on the forcible expulsion of Croats from the “Republic 
of  Srpska  Krajina”  in  1991.  The  events  of  August  1995  in  Croatia  were 
simultaneously a disaster for those Serbs who simply wanted to continue living in 
their ancestral homes in the Krajina region, while at the same time it really was the 
ultimate event in realizing the dream of a Croatia of, by and for Croats that had 
driven  Croatian  nationalist  politics  from  Ante  Starčević  in  the  mid-19th  century 
through Franjo Tuđman in the late 20th. 
This is not to say that “ancient animosities” must last forever, but rather that 
no-one should expect them to be assuaged quickly. And this message should not be 
surprising to anyone who looks at commemorations in American history. To take an 
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Massachusetts, 60 years after the first skirmish in the war, referred to the place as 
the spot where “was made the first forcible resistance to British aggression,” and on 
which “the first of the Enemy fell.” In 1910, the grave of these “Enemy” was finally 
marked, with the words that “they died to keep the past upon its throne.” Yet just 
after World War II, the tenor changed, and the monument placed then refers to the 
American rather than the British dead, and then says that the British fled and thus 
“began the separation of two kindred nations, now happily long united in peace.”
2 It 
only took 170 years to bring about this happy reunion! Historical memory is still not 
unified on the other border: a major monument in Mexico City is to the heroes who 
died trying to defend the city against the invading Americans, in 1847. 
But  the  British  after  the  revolution  were  far  away  (or  in  Canada  –  about 
100,000 Loyalists fled or were driven from the newly independent USA, 4% of the 
population  [Phillips  1999:  322]).  Conflicting  commemoration  of  former  enemies 
who were once again fellow-citizens was common in the USA for the century after 
the Civil War – or, as our late colleague Dennison Rusinow, a native Floridian, 
always  corrected  me,  the  War  Between  the  States,  or  the  War  of  Northern 
Aggression.  [I  should  note  that  as  a  native  New  Englander  whose  triple-great 
grandfather was in the Union army at Gettysburg, I may not be an unbiased source 
here].  The  “honored  dead”  referred  to  by  Abraham  Lincoln  in  the  Gettysburg 
Address were those of the Union Army only – the Confederate dead were not buried 
in  the  national  cemetery  there,  and  monuments  to  the  Confederate  forces  at 
Gettysburg were constructed only decades after those to the Union (1870s – 1880s), 
the first in 1917 (Virginia), the last in 1982 (Tennessee), and only three formerly 
Confederate states had erected monuments before the 100
th anniversary of the battle, 
in 1963. As recently as the OPEC oil embargo of 1973, there were bumper stickers 
saying “Let the Yankee Bastards Freeze!” 
All of which is simply to say that the idea of creating a unifying history for 
these various states is naïve, and contrary to the experience of other parts of the 
world. 
“Justice” as Roadblock 
  A  more  seriously  counter-productive  effort  at  molding  a  uniform, 
officialized  history  has  been  the  creation  of  the  International  Criminal  Tribunal 
(ICTY) to provide “justice” for the crimes committed during the wars in Yugoslavia. 
My view that this effort is counter-productive is grounded on several considerations: 
———— 
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First, the legitimacy of the ICTY has been rejected by most of the people 
throughout the region, and not just the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. Public 
opinion polls throughout the region have consistently shown that most people have 
low opinion of the Tribunal. One reason for this is that the members of each nation 
think that the purpose of the ICTY is to punish only those who victimized their 
people, and trust in the Tribunal vanishes as soon as a member of the subject nation 
is indicted – this happened, for example, among Croats when Croats were indicted, 
Bosniaks when Bosniaks were indicted, Kosovo Albanians when Kosovo Albanians 
were indicted. Being indicted has not injured the reputation of political leaders or 
generals. The prosecution of Milošević was so inept that the Serbian government 
that  had  extradicted  him  to  the  Hague  ended  direct  television  broadcasts  of  the 
proceedings,  while  Slobo’s  own  party  demanded  that  they  continue.  Similarly, 
Vojislav Šešelj’s party demanded that his trial be broadcast live, against the wishes 
of the government. Kosovo Albanian politician Ramush Haradinaj was at least as 
popular after ICTY indictment as he was before. Croatian General Ante Gotovina 
may be more popular than President Stipe Mesić, who extradited him to the Hague. 
Of  course,  it  is  widely  thought  that  Serbian  Prime  Minister  Zoran  Djindjić  was 
assassinated because he was threatening to send paramilitary figures to the Hague. 
Nor should this result have been unanticipated, as it was naive to expect any 
other.  The  matter  was  put  well  by  the  James  Brown  Scott,  legal  advisor  to  the 
American delegation at the Versailles peace conference, in an article about why the 
US delegation had been against the demand of the French and British that the Kaiser 
be put on trial. Scott (1921: 254) pointed out the complete rejection of the Germans 
to demands that their military officers be put on trial, saying “we can imagine the 
feelings of the American people if the fortunes of war had permitted Germany to 
demand that General Pershing, commander-in-chief of the American armies should 
be handed over to the enemy.” Another American Civil War referent: perhaps the 
first person in modern times to be executed for war crimes was Capt. Henry Wirz, 
the commandant of the Confederate prisoner of war camp at Andersonville, hanged 
in 1865. In 1909, however, the Daughters of the Confederacy built a monument to 
him  as  a  “hero-martyr”  who  had  been  “judicially  murdered”  (McPherson  1988: 
802). With the possible exception of Nuremberg, it is hard to find war-crimes trials 
ever being accepted by the nation whose soldiers were tried. 
A more subtle reason for the unpopularity of the Tribunal can be seen in a 
study done in Sarajevo of passersby, mainly Bosniak, in Sarajevo in 2003, in that 
70% of respondents thought that they had personally been victims of war crimes. 
Considering that Sarajevo  had 500,000 inhabitants before the  war, and that total 
casualties  during  it  were  about  10,000  dead  and  half  of  them  were  military 
personnel, it would not be possible for 70% of the population to have been victims 
of what any reasonable court could consider to be war crimes. Since the majority of 
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governing  war crimes,  no court could possibly  work to their satisfaction (Hagan 
2005). Even the Prosecutor of the ICTY has come to realize that the Tribunal will 
not gain acceptance in the Balkans. At a meeting in Sarajevo in March 2005, she 
acknowledged  that  “The  debate  on  war  crimes  in  the  former  Yugoslavia  is  not 
subsiding. It is present in the daily life and media, and always politicized .... the 
public  is  only  interested  about  those  suspected  or  accused,  or  in  politically,  not 
judicially, defined truth.” 
Thus perhaps the only more or less unified sentiment in the region that the 
Tribunal has succeeded in creating is that nobody has faith in it. But it was naïve to 
think that they ever would. In regard to such historical events there are always a 
number of cross-cutting elements to “the truth,” and I’m reminded of the comment 
made by one local expert to representatives of the ICTY’s prosecutor, when asked to 
testify against defendants of his own nation: “Everything you want me to say is true, 
but  it  isn’t  our  part  of  the  truth”  (I  should  note  that  the  person  in  question  is 
generally regarded as part of the anti-nationalist elite). Referring again to the former 
Yugoslavia, which portion of “the truth” can fit universally? 
Some  have  seen  the  ICTY  as  following  the  example  of  the  Nuremberg 
Tribunal,  but  the  Nuremberg  process  was  quick:  the  highest  ranking  German 
officials and officers were hanged in October 1946, and the tribunal itself ended its 
work in 1949, less than five years after the end of the war. In contrast, the ICTY 
issued  indictments through March 2005, fourteen years after some  of the  events 
concerned, and is scheduled to end its work in 2010, almost twenty years after the 
Yugoslav wars began, and fifteen years after the end of the Bosnian and Croatian 
wars, eleven after the Kosovo conflict. 
Is it really likely that a court that tries to keep the memory of massacres fresh 
for twenty years, and that is overwhelmingly mistrusted by the very people to whom 
it claims to bring  justice, is a force for reconciliation and the building  of stable 
political relations in the Balkans? It may be possible to find the disappeared and re-
open mass graves years after a conflict is over, as recent efforts to do just that in 
Chile,  Argentina  and  Mexico  show.  But  the  matter  may  still  be  touchy. 
Commemoration of  mass graves from the Spanish Civil War did not begin until 
more than 25 years after the death of Franco (Los Angeles Times, Dec. 8 2004), and 
removing the last statue of him from Madrid was only accomplished in 2005 (see 
BBC News, 17 March 2005 and accompanying links). One recent commentator has 
noted that demands for investigating now the crimes of the Franco era rupture the 
very  basis  of  the  inter-elite  agreements  that  made  possible  Spain’s  peaceful 
transition from authoritarian rule (Davis 2005). Had the  international  community 
taken  the  principled  stand  that  the  major  figures  of  the  Franco  regime  must  be 
punished as soon as the dictator died, it is hard to believe that Spain’s transition 
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Pretensions of “Justice” in Place of Infrastructure 
  The difference between the economic support given to the UCTY and that 
given  to  actually  rebuilding  the  infrastructure  of  the  former  Yugoslavia  is  also 
illuminating. Justice may be beyond price, but courts cost money, and the ICTY 
costs a lot of money. While its first annual budget (1993) was modest at $276,000
3 
by the next year the budget was $11 million. By 2001, the ICTY was budgeted at 
$96  million,  and  for  2006-07,  $276,474,100.  All  told,  from  1993-2005,  ICTY 
budgets totaled about $1.3 billion. In February 2007 the Tribunal employed 1144 
staff members (figures from ICTY web page). 
By way of comparison, consider the budgets of other international agencies 
working to rebuild Bosnia and Herzegovina. The task is immense: according to the 
World Bank, during the war, production fell by 90%, GDP fell by 80%, and half of 
the population was displaced; the economy is still only at 70% of its prewar level, 
with a per capita income of $1540.
4 Major actors have been: 
The  World  Bank:  since  1996,  the  World  Bank  has  committed  $1.1  billion 
directly  to  rebuild  infrastructure  and  to  promote  growth.
5  World  Bank  aid  has 
included  $30  million  to  modernize  the  educational  system,  $25  million  for  the 
rehabilitation of hospitals and clinics. Thus, each year, the ICTY gets about four 
times the total amount invested by the World Bank in Bosnia’s hospitals and clinics. 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP): One of the primary UN aid 
agencies, UNDP spent a total of $163 million in Bosnia between 1996 and 2004. 
Comparison to ICTY: total UNDP expenditures since 1996 are about 60% of the 
ICTY budget for 2004-05 alone. 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR): More than 600,000 
refugees and internally displaced persons remained in the Balkans as of 2004. The 
primary  agency  charged  with  assisting  them,  UNHCR,  had  a  2004  budget  of 
$50,356,841 (UNHCR 2004). By 2007, the number of refugees and IDPs in Bosnia 
was down to 90,000, and the UNHCR budget planning was for about $6.7 million to 
assist them, or about 2.4% of the amount that the ICTY will spend in handling fewer 
than 100 cases. 
OSCE: The OSCE is mandated as the key institution for building democratic 
political institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its budget for 2004 was 19 million 
Euros, or a bit over $20 million. The entire OSCE budget for 2007 is 168 million 
Euros,  less  than  that  of  the  ICTY.  Comparison  to  ICTY:  The  OSCE  mission  to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has a budget of about 15% of the ICTY. 
———— 
3 All budget figures are from http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm. 
4 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/BOSNIAHERZEXTN  
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Office of the High Representative (OHR): The Dayton peace agreement that 
ended the  war in  Bosnia and Herzegovina created the OHR to  oversee Bosnia’s 
transition to peace and stability. OHR is the key international civilian institution in 
Bosnia and  is  effectively the  only governmental authority that reaches all  of the 
country. As of January 2007, OHR’s budget is about 6.6 million Euros with a staff 
of 46 internationals and about 200 locals. Comparison to the ICTY: the OHR budget 
is about 3.6% of the annual budget of the ICTY. 
Whether  “justice”  should  be  valued  more  than  economic  and  political 
development is a question that has not, to my knowledge, been asked. But let us 
imagine what the situation in the “white hole” of the Western Balkans might have 
been  had  the  $1.3  billion  spent  on  the  ICTY,  or  even  half  of  it,  been  spent  on 
actually rebuilding the region. 
An Empire of Infrastructure and Values? 
  I said earlier that an empire is a set of mechanisms for bringing separate 
nations,  and  states,  into  a  cooperative  economic  framework.  Past  empires  have 
stressed loyalty to the Emperor, which the EU certainly does not do; and how many 
roads actually lead to Brussels? But that last rhetorical question may be part of the 
answer: not many, because there are so many roads leading so many places. The EU 
may  be  more  effectively  implementing  what  was  once  said  to  be  the  working 
principle  of  Yugoslavia:  multi-centered  centralism,  but  doing  it  with  so  many 
centers of so many different kinds of power that, unlike Yugoslavia, the EU can 
survive. 
This  imperial  structure  is  not  really  democratic,  and  cannot  be.  Economic 
infrastructure is often placed at a remove as far as possible from daily politics: think, 
in the U.S., of the Federal Reserve system and its chairman, or of the regulation of 
interstate commerce, and disputes arising from interstate commerce, to the Federal 
government and federal courts. The “democratic deficit” of the EU is famous. The 
elected European Parliament actually has almost no legislative competence, while 
effective  economic  regulation  is  carried  out  by  bodies  that  have  no  more 
accountability to voters than does the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors: none 
whatever. 
In place of the Emperor, though, the EU does have those Values (democracy, 
freedom,  social  justice,  the  rule  of  law,  human  rights  and  the  protection  of 
minorities) upon which it was supposedly based, even though it was actually based 
on increasing the economic value of trade. Rather perversely, I think, these Values 
are  now  being  invoked  to  justify  exclusion  of  the  Western  Balkans  from  the 
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must question those academic analyses that demand “conditionality,” the meeting of 
various kinds of moral standards by candidate countries, before EU membership can 
be granted. 
The  expansion  of  infrastructure  for  transport  and  communication,  though, 
may have beneficial effects even if EU membership is delayed. The adoption of the 
standards needed to trade with EU countries takes place long before membership. 
And it is possible to have the benefits of integration into Europe without joining the 
EU: cf. Switzerland and Norway. 
Whether an empire can be held together by shared “values” is anyone’s guess, 
and I am, frankly, skeptical. The meanings given to specific “values” can vary and 
are almost certain to do so over time. It seems that it was no easier to hold together 
the Kalifat than it was the various Christian empires of Europe, and those in the US 
who  feared  a  monolithic  world  communism  in  the  1950s  miscalculated  the 
importance of local factors, thus predicting neither Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948 
or the Chinese break  from the Soviet  Union a  decade later. In 2007, the Polish 
government  seemed  to  be  working  hard  at  testing  the  limits  of  institutions  of 
“democracy,” with lustration policies that seemed most reminiscent of the McCarthy 
period in the USA; and the concepts of protection of minorities and of human rights 
are also being tested in the EU, as they are in the US, in the name of “security.” 
An empire of common infrastructure, regulations and standards, though, may 
have greater durability, since it would be based on facilitating the common activities 
of  people  rather  than  pretending  to  depend  on  them  thinking  in  a  way  that  is 
politically  correct.  Recall  the  carry-overs  from  earlier  empires  that  have  given 
elements of commonality to the peoples of the region: scripts, religious traditions, 
foods in their variety (every nation has its own version of burek), legal traditions, 
competing yet for that reason complementary folklore…. If I may cite my Pittsburgh 
colleague Milica Bakić-Hayden (2006) in a keynote that she gave a couple of years 
ago on imperial legacies in the Balkans, the constitution of the Balkans peoples lies 
in their different, and differentiating, manifestations of elements of their common 
imperial heritages. 
Anticipatory Nostalgia for Diversity 
  By the end of this paper, I am afraid that I am sounding rather like a neo-
liberal (never a neo-con, please!), in advocating progress through trade and common 
infrastructure. So perhaps I may don again my anthropological mantle, the one that 
revels in the differences between peoples and cultures and sees uniformity as the 
greatest danger to diversity (it might be interesting on some other occasion to debate 
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many of the cultural practices that distinguish peoples from each other), and engage 
in some anticipatory nostalgia, for some elements of the diversity that has defined 
the Balkans through the self-differentiation of its peoples. In doing so I may well be 
“longing for a past by concentrating on a future yet to arrive,” to adopt a graceful 
phrase by Esra Ozyurek (2006: 9), though not quite with her analytical bent. She and 
others have argued that nostalgia is a corollary of neoliberal modernism that creates 
commodities out of memories, thus creating the desire necessary for consumption. 
Yet  there  may  also  be  utility  to  seeing  nostalgia  as  an  aid  to  countering 
uniformity  via  the  elimination  of  differences,  that  oft-complained  of  part  of 
globalization. 
Let me be concrete, with food, drink and music. On the food part, one of the 
less  fortunate  consequences  of  the  advancement  of  trade  and  commerce  in  the 
Balkans,  as  elsewhere,  is  the  rapid  disappearance  of  tasty,  fresh  local  fruits  and 
vegetables for those hardy, cheap but truly awful-tasting hybrids that we see now in 
the US and western Europe. A common complaint throughout the region over the 
past decade is that you can’t get good tomatoes any more, and it’s pretty much true, 
at least in the markets in Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania where I’ve 
looked. EU standards, one is told; though the cheap tomatoes are often from Turkey, 
thus illustrating how the frontier of EU regulation and standards moves ahead of 
membership. 
But  the  triumph  of  cheap,  tasteless  tomatoes  can  be  written  off  purely  to 
market economics. More intriguing is the rapid decline of what used to be one of the 
diagnostic  social  commodities  of  the  region,  Turkish  coffee  (or  Greek,  Cypriot, 
Serbian, black, boiled, “domestic” or “homemade,” or, least controvertibly, “our” 
[Bakić-Hayden 2006]). What is interesting to me is that it is increasingly difficult to 
get it in public in the region. I don’t think that this is because people don’t like it; 
they still make it at home, and for Balkans visitors to my university’s Center for 
Russian & East European Studies, one of the happier moments of their stay in the 
USA comes when we serve real coffee (Turkish/ Greek etc.) from a real džezva. But 
in restaurants in  Balkan cities, one  finds  increasingly, and by this time  in  many 
places almost exclusively, espresso. 
Both forms of coffee have partisans but, unlike the tomatoes, this is not a 
matter of taste in the mouth. Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) analysis of the sociology of 
the judgment of taste argues that decisions of esthetical superiority are not grounded 
in the objective characteristics of the subject being evaluated, but rather depend on 
the social status of those who claim to prefer each component of the set. Using this 
principle, the rapid replacement of Turkish coffee by espresso in public settings in 
the  Balkans reflects the superior status associations  of  espresso, European rather 
than Balkan, Italian rather than Turkish. We see similar processes at work in the 
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France (though the idea or marketing varietals is from California), but fortunately 
the Bulgarians still hold their own with mavrud, the Croats with plavac mali (the 
original  zinfandel),  the  Herzegovinians  with  žilavka,  the  Montenegrins  with 
vranac….  Whether  these  work  for  export  is  another  matter,  but  maybe  the 
popularity of these local varieties in the region is a mark of the cultural intimacy 
(Herzfeld 1997) that still prevails in the region. 
Let me close with a look at the symbolism of music, admitting from the start 
that this is purely an exercise in interpretation, a bit afield from my usual grounding 
in  empirical social science. The texts to be analyzed are from that grand annual 
exhibition  of  European  kitsch,  the  Eurovision  Song  contest,  which  everyone 
bemoans and yet everyone watches. 
The surprise winner in 2007 was Marija Šerifović from Serbia, with a song 
called molitva (prayer). It’s a pretty enough song, but while it is not sung in English, 
the style is distinctly “western” and otherwise not stylistically distinctive – it could 
be sung by Celine Dion, were she to learn Serbian. It is certainly not “Balkan” in 
any identifiable sense other than by language. 
The  singer  is  from  the  Balkans,  but  with  a  twist.  And  here  I  have  to  go 
completely  off  the  tracks  of  empirical  social  science,  unless  we  really  buy  into 
Balkans conspiracy theories and say that Šerifović’s win was rigged or purposes of 
political symbolism; but the symbolism is just too good to pass up. 
First, Marija Šerifović is a member of the Roma minority, but she’s singing 
thoroughly  non-Roma  music  –  this  is  not  Esma  Redžepova.  Further  she  was 
accompanied by what the British press referred to as “the Sappho squad,” women in 
men’s suits backing up the singer. The word immediately went out in Belgrade that 
Marija is a lesbian. Now, is this a dream of a European Balkans, or what? A lesbian 
Roma  woman  from  Serbia,  singing  a  very  non-Balkans  song,  as  winner  of  the 
Eurovision Song contest? What a triumph of the EU’s officialized European values! 
And  is  this  a  different,  European  Serbia,  in  which  a  lesbian  Roma  woman  can 
become a national heroine? 
And it is a good song, very well sung (I said earlier that I have old-fashioned 
and romantic tastes). But the music has not much connection to the Balkans. 
On the other hand, the 2006 Eurovision Song contest had a song, this one 
from Croatia by Severina Vučković, that was very much Balkans in arrangement and 
sources. The symbolism of it is another matter, however. This music is clearly from 
the  Balkans, and Severina  was criticized  in Croatia by people  who said that the 
music was Serbian (she and her composer say it is Dalmatian). It has some standard 
touches  of  male  dominance  (Ajde  pile  moje!  ...  Opet  mala!  …  Ajde  moja!),  but 
they’re ironic. The incongruity between the singer’s red dress and the traditional 
men’s costumes is great, and if one follows the words, this is a self-confident young 
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“Hey, I know your type only too well”!]), and is clearly leading the band. In the 
commercial video, her stiletto heels are dominating Zagreb. And the song ends with 
that  nearly  universal  Balkans  linguistic  carry-over  from  the  time  of  Ottoman 
political, hence Turkish linguistic dominance, Ajde! 
It is not exactly that Europeans were looking for ballads that year – Severina 
lost out to Lordi, a Finnish hard rock/ heavy metal band, with the very consciously 
sacrilegious song “Hard Rock Hallelujah.” We could analyze the symbolism of that 
victory some other time. It seems that Europe was not ready and willing to reward 
an obviously Balkan style, even as a send-up and inversion of traditional images of 
Balkan male dominance. 
The Balkans, on the other hand, as a region seems still to maintain a diversity 
greater than that in the rest of Europe. Back to music one more time, the biggest pop 
music festival in Europe is now in Serbia, the Exit Festival every July; yet the Guča 
festival of Balkans brass bands, also in Serbia every August, is even bigger than 
that.  It  is  my  hope  that  the  infrastructure  of  the  Balkans  can  be  rebuilt  without 
leading to the diminishing of the very differences that make the place interesting, 
and that let the Balkans, perhaps more than the rest of Europe, make truly manifest 
the motto of the European Union: “United in Diversity” – but still very diverse. 
References 
Bakić-Hayden, Milica (2006) “Empires are Us: Identifying with Differences.” 
Dinkić,  Mlađen  (1997)  Ekonomija  destrukcije:  velika  pljačka  naroda.  Beograd:  Stubovi 
kulture. 
Drća, Slobodan (2006) Medijana. Niš: Narodni Muzej. 
Glenny, Misha (2008) McMafia: A Journey through the Global Criminal Underworld. New 
York: Kindle Books. 
Hayden, Robert M. (1996) “Schindler’s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing and Population 
Transfers.” Slavic Review 
Herzfeld, Michael (1997) Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State. New York: 
Routledge. 
Hurtic, Zlatko et al., “Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ in S. Forman and S. Patrick, eds., Good 
Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post-conflict Recovery. Boulder: Lynn Reiner. 
Kostova, Elizabeth (2005) The Historian. New York: Little, Brown. 
Ozyurek, Esra (2006) Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in 
Turkey. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Phillips,  Kevin  (1999)  The  Cousins’  War:  Religion,  Politics  and  the  Triumph  of  Anglo-
America. New York: Basic Books. 
Syme, Ronald (1999) The Provincial at Rome and Rome in the Balkans. Edited by Anthony 
Birley. Exeter: University of Exeter Press. 